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A

ISTORY OF CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
IN STATE COURT
Anne Fleming*

A STRACT
Most historians date the “modern” class action to the 1966 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet, the class action or
“representative suit” has a longer, unexplored history in the state courts. In
the late 1930s and 1940s, a group of scrappy, first-generation lawyers tried
to build their businesses by aggregating the small-sum claims of many
consumers. The defendants in these cases were, for example, lenders who
failed to comply with the technicalities of state disclosure mandates, and
utility companies that charged consumers extra fees. Each consumer’s claim
was small, but, as a group, the claims could yield a recovery large enough to
make the case worthwhile for an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyer.
State courts were not ready to embrace the consumer class action,
however, for a few reasons. First, representative consumer suits threatened
the professional identity of the organized bar. Class counsel came from the
same ranks as personal injury attorneys, derisively labeled “ambulance
chasers” by legal elites, and they similarly viewed litigation as a means to
earn their fees. Both the bench and the elite bar disapproved of this approach.
Second, representative consumer suits threatened the business community.
Judges were sensitive to the objections of businessmen, who had been
involved in writing some of the laws that class plaintiffs now sought to turn
against them. Finally, past judicial decisions concerning representative suits
did not favor allowing consumers to aggregate their claims, in the absence
of some “common interest” among the plaintiffs or proof that the defendant
had insufficient funds to pay all class members in full. In response to these
concerns, state courts delayed the development of procedural devices that
would have provided meaningful remedies for violations of substantive
consumer rights. Without these remedies, substantive rights proved of more
limited value.
This history underscores the importance of effective enforcement
mechanisms in consumer law, which typically pits numerous individuals with
small-dollar claims against more sophisticated and well-resourced
corporate defendants. It also shifts the narrative arc of consumer law’s
history. Rather than a story of decline, in which the remedial promise of
Federal Rule 23 was thwarted by contractual developments and judicial
maneuvering in the 1990s and beyond, it becomes a story of reversion, in
which judicial, legislative, and business hostility to class actions near
century’s end caused the pendulum to swing back towards norms that had
prevailed in state courts at the very beginning of the consumer class action
era.
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INTRODUCTION
By most accounts, the 1960s witnessed two momentous legal events: the
birth of consumer law and the creation of the modern class action.1 It makes
sense that these developments would have occurred in the same era.
Consumer law endows individuals with substantive rights that, when
violated, often result in small-dollar damage awards. Absent procedural
mechanisms that allow consumers to aggregate their small-dollar claims and
bring a single suit for damages, these rights will rarely be enforced through
private litigation. To bring an individual suit for a small-dollar claim, a
litigant would need to have free or low-cost legal assistance.
According to this narrative, in the 1960s and 1970s, federal statutes and
regulations created and expanded consumer rights, which could then be
vindicated through class action suits brought under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or state-law equivalents. 2 In the late 1990s,
however, companies began inserting mandatory arbitration provisions with
class action waivers into their form contracts, which prevented consumers
from aggregating their claims in court. 3 Although consumers challenged
these provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Arbitration
Act to bar most challenges and overturned consumer-friendly state court
decisions that would have allowed class litigation to proceed.4 The Court’s
most recent decisions have offered some victories to classes in securities and
employment cases, but consumer classes have largely suffered defeats. 5
Thus, despite the flowering of federal consumer rights that began four
decades ago, industry legal maneuvers coupled with favorable judicial
decisions have rendered those rights unenforceable through private lawsuits.
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D. (History), University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., Harvard Law School. [Eds. It is with great sadness that we note the untimely
passing of Anne Fleming on August 25, 2020. This article is being published with the permission
of her family. It is just a small glimpse of her talent and the insight that she had to share with the
world. Even as we still learn from her, we are reminded of how much we will miss.]
1.Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionalization of
Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147 (2010) (beginning in
1969 with the Federal Truth in Lending Act); David Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action,
Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2012) (beginning with the
drafting of FRCP 23 and dating the modern era of class actions to 1966 when revised Rule 23 took
effect).
2. Stephen C. Yeazell, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
(1987).
3. Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396–98 (2005).
4. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011) (holding that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempted California’s rule that class action waivers in consumer form contracts
were unconscionable under some circumstances).
5. J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-Transsubstantive Class Action, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1625–1668, 1650–1653 (2016) (describing the Court’s procedural decisions in class action
cases and arguing that the variation in outcomes tracks the underlying substantive law at issue,
distinguishing consumer-type cases from others). But see generally Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
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This history is accurate, but incomplete because its starting point is
decades too late. Although federal rights and federal remedies have mattered
to consumers, the states adopted the earliest consumer laws and witnessed
the earliest attempts to aggregate consumer claims. Historians and legal
scholars have largely ignored state-level developments, perhaps because they
are stories of failure – of attorneys thwarted in their efforts to aggregate
claims and litigants left with consumer rights backed by ineffective remedies.
Yet, in many ways, the history of consumer class actions in state courts
foreshadows more recent trends. Like the conventional narrative about
federal rights and remedies, it affirms that substantive consumer law and
procedural rules have developed in tandem. The creation of substantive
consumer rights did induce efforts by attorneys to aggregate low-value claims
in order to provide a means for their redress – just earlier than the
conventional narrative suggests. Moreover, it reveals that earlier generations
of state judges shared the modern U.S. Supreme Court’s hostility to consumer
class actions. But, unlike the modern Court, these judges voiced those
concerns directly, rather than allowing them to rest under the surface.6
More broadly, the incorporation of state-level developments into the
story shifts the narrative arc of consumer law’s history. The traditional
narrative, told from a federal vantage point, is a story of lost promise, in
which contractual developments and procedural decisions in the 1990s and
2000s thwarted the full vindication of substantive federal consumer rights
through private litigation. But when the states are incorporated, the story
instead becomes one of gradual reversion to the pre-1960s status quo, in
which growing judicial, legislative, and business hostility to class actions
near century’s end caused the pendulum to swing back towards norms that
had prevailed in state courts decades before – at the very beginning of the
consumer class action era in state courts.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys doctrinal developments
in class action law and explains why state courts provided the only viable
venue for aggregation of consumer claims in the early 20th century. Part II
describes how several enterprising lawyers attempted to pursue
representative consumer actions in state courts in the 1930s and 40s, largely
without success. Courts rejected suits for money damages against lenders and
utility providers, among others, in light of concerns about fee-hungry
plaintiffs’ lawyers polluting the legal profession and in deference to 19th
century doctrinal understandings. Part III chronicles how state hostility to
consumer class actions slowly began to thaw in the 1960s and 1970s,
6. J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-Transsubstantive Class Action, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1653 (2016) (arguing that “it is the Court’s composite judgment regarding the interaction of
class action procedures with low-value claims, unsophisticated parties, and lawyer-driven suits, and
not the interaction of class procedures with the ‘nature’ of arbitration under the FAA, that produces
the deleterious effects of the class action the Court seems so determined to eliminate”).
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beginning with Illinois and California. Part IV then examines the fate of class
actions in the states in the 1980s and beyond, after most jurisdictions updated
their rules to track the newly-amended Rule 23 on class actions. As Part IV
describes, state courts served as the main venue for consumer class actions
until two recent developments diminished their jurisdiction: the 2005 federal
Class Action Fairness Act and a string of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
allowing defendants to force consumer claims into arbitration. The
Conclusion reflects on how the landscape of consumer class action litigation
has changed over the past century.
I

DOCTRINAL DE ELOPMENTS

The roots of modern state court class actions reach back to the mid-19th
century Field Code of Civil Procedure.7 Drafted and first adopted in New
York in 1848 and amended in 1849, the Field Code provided that “when the
question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when
the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.”8
Along with the rest of the Field Code, this provision spread to other states
and became, in the words of one scholar, “the American standard provision
for class actions.”9 The rule then remained on the books, in modified form,
in at least fifteen states into the 1970s.10
To the extent that consumers sought to pursue class litigation prior to the
revision of the Federal Rules in 1966, they had to look to state courts and
state procedure. Although Rule 38 of the 1912 Federal Rules of Equity
tracked the Field Code language authorizing representative actions, it was
soon supplanted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which merged law
and equity at the federal level in 1938. The new Federal Rule 23 also provided
for class actions, but divided these into three categories: the “true” class
where members held joint or common rights (such as shareholder derivative
suits), the “hybrid” class where members held individual rights that needed
to be aggregated to ensure equitable distribution of payments out of a limited
recovery fund or piece of property (such as a suit by creditors against an
insolvent defendant), and the “spurious” class where class members each
asserted an individual claim for injury that arose out of some common set of
facts.11 Spurious class actions were different in kind because class members
had to opt-in to the action in order to be bound by the judgement, unlike for
7. The Field Code, in turn, merged procedures at law with those in equity, which allowed for
group litigation. On the medieval roots of group litigation, see Yeazell, supra note 2.
8. James E. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action - Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.
L. REV. 407, 435 (1969).
9. Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 613
(1971).
10. Id. at 613.
11. Marcus, supra note 1 at 600–601.
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true or hybrid actions.12 In this way, the spurious class action functioned as a
“permissive joinder device” rather than like a modern class action with res
judicata effect on absent class members.13
Consumer suits, which fell into the third category of “spurious” actions,
were difficult to pursue in federal court both because of the opt-in
requirement and because of subject matter limitations on federal court
jurisdiction. Before the late 1960s, consumers lacked federal substantive
rights and so could not bring suits that implicated questions or issues of
federal law. Furthermore, consumers could not meet the jurisdictional limit
for diversity cases, meaning those arising between residents of different
states, because plaintiffs in “spurious” class suits could not aggregate their
claims to meet the minimum “amount in controversy” requirement.14
The earliest consumer lawsuits asserted state-law claims in state courts.
Beginning in the 1910s, states adopted statutes and regulations that granted
legal protections to consumers against overreaching by those with superior
bargaining power, such as lenders, retailers, and utility providers. These legal
developments both reflected and enabled broader social and economic
transformations. By this time, more people lived in urban, rather than rural,
areas and relied on wages to support themselves.15 Beginning in the late 19th
century, electrical utilities began offering service to urban homes, gradually
supplanting gas light and candles as the primary sources of residential
lighting.16 In addition to fuel and light, urban families purchased their food
and clothing, and rented their housing. With increasing frequency, they
bought mass-produced, factory-made goods rather than items made by local
artisans or at home. 17 And when household expenses exceeded incomes,
credit sometimes filled the gap. 18 All of these developments meant that
ordinary people regularly contracted with businesses to procure their day-to12. Id. at 601.
13. Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts Developments in the Law, 71 HARV. L. REV.
874, 930 (1957) (quoting 3 Moore, Federal Practice 23.11 at 3465).
14. Starrs, supra note 8 at 411 (noting that “it was all but gospel under Rule 23, prior to the 1966
amendments, that aggregation would be permitted to establish the jurisdictional amount in diversity
cases only where the claims were joint [the true class action]”); see also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332 (1969) (refusing to allow aggregation of claims to satisfy amount-in-controversy requirement
for consumer class suit under new FRCP 23); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
(holding that all plaintiffs must satisfy amount-in-controversy requirement, not just named
plaintiffs). This jurisdictional barrier was later eroded by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
545 U.S. 546, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), interpreting the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute to
provide jurisdiction over all class claims where at least one named plaintiff met the amount-incontroversy requirement. See infra, Part IV.
15. SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS
MARKET (Reprint edition ed. 2004).
16. Id.
17. On this shift, see id.
18. ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS: A CENTURY OF FRINGE FINANCE (2018).
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day necessities, which multiplied the opportunities for small consumer
injuries to arise.
II REPRESENTATI E SUITS IN T E

S AND

S

Although mass consumption provided one necessary prerequisite for
mass consumer litigation, other ingredients were also required. Consumers
also needed lawyers willing to bring their claims to court. Local legal aid
societies offered free legal assistance in some cities, but only to poor litigants
that the lawyers deemed deserving of help. They shied away from cases
involving small loans and debt forgiveness. 19 In the absence of free
assistance, consumers had to seek out private counsel that accepted feegenerating cases and did not reject clients based on whether they were
deemed morally deserving of assistance.
These attorneys had already drawn the ire of the elite bar by seeking to
make a profit through personal injury cases filed against corporate
defendants.20 These attorneys, nicknamed “ambulance chasers,” flooded the
New York City courts with personal injury suits in the 1920s, which
prompted an investigation of their professional practices. 21 The attorneys
often worked as solo practitioners, came from immigrant households, and
were Jewish or Catholic.22 The elite bar criticized the upstart lawyers for
accepting cases on a contingency-fee basis, for actively soliciting clients, and
for purportedly lowering the public perception of the profession.23
In the late 1930s and 1940s, a handful of these upstart, non-elite lawyers
branched out into consumer cases. Attorney Israel Beckhardt, the grandson
of German immigrants, numbered among them. Beckhardt was born in New
York in 1907, earned a B.S. from City College, and graduated from New
York Law School in 1931. 24 He began his career representing workers’
compensation claimants before he instituted a suit on behalf of a class of
utility customers in 1938.25 Beckhardt represented Brooklyn resident Marcel

19. Id. at 89.
20. Kenneth De Ville, New York City attorneys and ambulance chasing in the 1920s, 59
HISTORIAN 290 (1997).
21. Id. at 292. (describing the “flood of lawsuits that overwhelmed the local courts” with jury
cases in the main trial court for Manhattan rising from 9,309 in 1915 to 29,466 in 1927 due to an
increase in personal injury suits).
22. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 50 (1976).
23. De Ville, supra note 20 at 293.
24. Martindale-Hubbell directory list, 1934; 1910 Census for Beckhardt family (Bronx, NY)
25. Knorr v. Gen. Baking Co., 278 N.Y.S. 3, 4 (App. Div. 1935) (Beckhardt representing widow
of deceased bread salesman); Record on Appeal, Sciborski v. Childs Co., 288 N.Y.S. 1083 (App.
Div. 1936) (Beckhardt representing waitress disabled by fall at work). Beckhardt also represented
one of over 15,000 shareholders in the Bank of United States and a defendant shoe company sued
for negligence related to a water overflow. Broderick v. Aaron, 272 N.Y.S. 219 (Sup. Ct.
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Kovarsky, who sought an injunction and refund of fees against the Brooklyn
Union Gas company for collecting a $1 service charge billed to him to
reconnect his residential gas after a voluntary disconnection of service over
the summer. 26 Kovarsky sued in a representative capacity, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, alleging that the service charge was
impermissible under New York’s 1928 Public Service Law that prohibited
gas providers from assessing service charges. 27 On behalf of the class,
Kovarsky also sought an accounting to those who already paid the charge and
a declaratory judgment and an injunction for the benefit of those who could
be subject to the charge in the future.28
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that Kovarsky could seek an
injunction and a declaratory judgment, but not an accounting – essentially, a
request for the gas company to return the $1 charge to each class member
who had paid it.29 According to the decision, to maintain a representative
action for monetary relief, the plaintiff would need to allege either “that a
multiplicity of suits is threatened” or that the defendant had limited funds to
pay a judgment.30 Kovarsky alleged neither. On remand to the trial court,
Kovarsky obtained a declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing the
gas company from billing or collecting reconnection service charges, but no
money.31 The trial court also ruled that Beckhardt could not collect attorneys’
fees from the class because the class did not receive any funds from the gas
company.32 Beckhardt had requested a fee of twenty percent of the illegal
service charges collected, which he estimated at $250,000 to $500,000 in
total.33
The attorneys’ fees ruling erected a nearly insuperable barrier to the
pursuit of future class claims. Attorneys could not afford to represent
consumers if plaintiffs could recover neither monetary damages nor
attorneys’ fees. Beckhardt appealed the fee denial but met with no greater
sympathy at the appeals court. The lawyer for the gas company accused
Beckhardt of bringing the case merely to “earn a fee” and lamented that such
litigation lowered the reputation of the profession. According to the gas
company’s lawyer, law should be practiced as “a profession” and should not

1934), aff’d, 277 N.Y.S. 499 (App. Div. 1935), aff’d, 268 N.Y. 411 (1935) (shareholder); Ribbon
Narrow Fabric Co. v. Wellington Shoe Co., 272 N.Y.S. 516 (Mun. Ct. 1934) (negligence).
26. Kovarsky v. Brook. Union Gas Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div.), aff’d, 279 N.Y. 304 (1938)
(appeal from dismissal by trial court).
27. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 65(6) (added by N.Y. L. 1923, c. 898).
28. Kovarsky v. Brook. Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 314 (1938).
29. Id. ; 1A Corpus Juris Secundum Accounting § 6.
30. Kovarsky, 279 N.Y. at 314 (1938).
31. Kovarsky v. Brook. Union Gas Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff’d, 25
N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 1941).
32. New Suit Asks Refund of Gas Company Fees, BROOK. CITIZEN, Dec. 11 1940, at 1.
33. Id.
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be allowed to “degenerate into a law business.”34 He warned the court that it
must deny fees to Beckhardt to “keep [law] a profession.” In response,
Beckhardt argued that “whoever benefits a class is entitled to a fee” for
serving in “the role of public benefactor,” and noted that he represented
litigants “to collect fees, the same as the counsel for the gas company.”35 But
the appeals court did not budge. After Beckhardt lost the appeal, he shifted
his practice towards shareholder derivative suits.36
Despite Beckhardt’s failure, other upstart attorneys tried their luck at
aggregating consumer claims into representative suits in the 1940s. They
brought these actions on behalf of classes of consumers who had borrowed
cash from personal finance companies. Like public utilities, finance
companies in most states operated under strict regulations that capped their
maximum charges. State legislatures adopted these regulations to meet the
challenge of a mass consumption economy, in which households regularly
transacted with large corporations that possessed superior bargaining power
and could dictate the contract terms. Claims arising under state regulatory
statutes were particularly amenable to class treatment because they were
usually based on deficiencies in standardized written terms or uniform rate
schedules. As such, each plaintiff’s claim relied on a shared factual
foundation and did not require individualized proof of wrongdoing. In this
way, these statutory claims differed from those based on common law
prohibitions against fraud, which might take many forms and depend on
proof of the specific interactions between the fraudster and each individual
consumer to establish deception and reliance.37
In New York, two attorneys – Noah Rotwein and Irwin Slater – each
attempted to bring a representative suit on behalf of personal finance
company customers in 1943.38 Both men came from immigrant households
and did not rank among the elite of the profession. 39 Slater, born Irving
Slutzkin, anglicized his name after entering the practice of law in 1938,
perhaps to distance himself from his Russian-Jewish immigrant background.
Rotwein, admitted to the bar in 1935, was likewise descended from RussianJewish immigrants, but retained his family name. 40 Both seem to have
worked on a contingency fee basis, like their brethren who represented
personal injury plaintiffs.41
34. Fred Andersen, New Suit Seeks Refund of Gas Fees of 300,000, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, Dec.
11 1940, at 3.
35. Id.
36. See e.g., Baker v. Macfadden Publ’ns, 59 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 1946), rev’d, 300 N.Y.
325, (1950); Wagner v. Armsby, 35 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1942).
37. EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 11–
12, 49 (2017).
38. FLEMING, supra note 18, at 90–91.
39. Neither appears in the Martindale-Hubbell national directory of lawyers.
40. FLEMING, supra note 18, at 91.
41. Id. at 92–93.
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Slater represented consumers Richard and Ella Challenger and “all others
similarly situated” in a suit to void their loans from Household Finance Corp.
The Challengers sought to prevent the lender from collecting on the $255
loan that they took out in 1942, of which they had repaid $7.44. The lawsuit
alleged that the lender’s standardized form contract violated New York’s
lending laws, specifically because some of the boilerplate language stated
that the “holder” of the debt could accelerate the loan in the event of default,
while some of the other fine print specified that “Household Finance” could
do so. This alleged “inconsistency” invalidated the loans under New York’s
lending laws, Slater argued, meaning that the borrowers would not have to
repay any amounts outstanding and would receive a refund of any payments
already made.42 Slater estimated that Household’s daily collections in New
York State, which the lawsuit would halt, amounted to over $75,000 per day
and that the plaintiff class had already overpaid $50 million in principal and
interest on voidable loans over the past three years.43 He also noted that the
borrowers’ only hope for relief was to aggregate their claims into a
representative suit; the class was “too numerous” for each individual
borrower to appear before the court.44
Noah Rotwein likewise sued a personal finance company, Madison
Personal Loan, on behalf of borrower Irving Berk and other similarly situated
borrowers. 45 Berk borrowed $144 secured by a mortgage on his car and
agreed to pay a $12.50 charge for insurance on the vehicle.46 On behalf of
Berk and the class members, Rotwein argued that the insurance charge was
unlawful and that “similar amounts were extorted from some 10,000 other
borrowers.”47 He sought recovery of all the insurance fees paid to the lender,
which totaled more than $25,000.48
Just as the courts denied Israel Beckhardt’s class claim for monetary
relief against a utility company, the courts dismissed the representative suits
by both Berk and the Challengers, without much legal reasoning. 49 The
Challenger court concluded that the plaintiffs “have no right to sue on behalf
of others,” without further explanation.50 It then admonished Irwin Slater for
manufacturing the litigation, suggesting that he might have violated the
42. Id. at 94. ; Record on Appeal at 8, Challenger v. Household Finance Co., 43 N.Y.S.2d 517
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1943), New York State Appellate Division Records, New York State Library,
Albany, New York.
43. Record on Appeal at 15, 26, Challenger v. Household Finance Co., 43 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 1943), New York State Appellate Division Records, New York State Library,
Albany, New York
44. FLEMING, supra note 18, at 94.
45. Id. at 95.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.

140

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

ethical canons against attorneys soliciting clients. The judge warned Slater
that “most of the borrowers are honest enough to pay their debts and you are
not to go out and solicit these cases.”51 The Berk court provided even less
guidance to the litigants. The court dismissed the case for a pleading error
without reaching the question of whether Berk could sue on behalf of others
for monetary relief.52 But the Berk decision suggested that a representative
suit required class members to share a common bond or interest, akin to the
relationship among creditors all seeking payment from the debtor’s limited
funds. In support, the court cited a case brought by the customers of an
international money transmitter who failed to transmit their money, stole the
customers’ funds, and absconded. 53 The class members could proceed
because they had to seek pro rata payment of their claims from the surety
bond that the transmitter had posted.54
Other New York cases reached similar results. The New York Court of
Appeals, the state’s highest court, rejected an attempt by a group of bond
certificate holders to bring a representative action on behalf of themselves
and other similarly-situated investors to rescind their purchases based on
fraud. The court reasoned that the complaint failed to state a claim for
rescission on behalf of “similarly situated” bond purchasers because each
plaintiff entered into a separate transaction with the seller based on distinct
representations about the transaction. 55 The New York Court of Appeals
likewise found that a class of bank depositors could not bring a representative
action on behalf of themselves and thousands of others against a foreign bank
for failure to repay funds deposited. The court held that “[s]eparate wrongs
to separate persons, though committed by similar means and even pursuant
to a single plan, do not alone create a common or general interest in those
who are wronged.”56

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 95–96.
See Guffanti v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 196 N.Y. 452 (1909).
Id. at 456.
Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 238 (1937) (“Upon such sales the
representations, if any, made by the seller and relied on by the buyer may have been different in
each case.”).
56. Soc’y Milion Athena v. Nat’l Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292 (1939); see also Bouton
v. Van Buren, 229 N.Y. 17, 22 (1920) (“A representative action cannot be maintained unless it
appears from proper allegations in the complaint that the plaintiff not only has a cause of action, but
that he is representative of a common or general interest of others.”). New York courts similarly
barred “representative actions” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) based on New York
procedural rules and instead required each employee-plaintiff to be joined separately in any action.
Simmons v. Rudolph Knitting Mills, 35 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (App. Div. 1942). Congress later
amended the FLSA to prohibit representative suits entirely and to require employees to opt-in to
any collective action through written consent. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, 8oth
Cong. 1st Sess., § 5(a); But see Hunt v. Nat’l Linen Serv. Corp., 157 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tenn. 1941);
Potts v. Stedman Co., No. 17774, 1942 WL 6495, at *2 (Ohio Com. Pl. Feb. 21, 1942) (allowing
representative suit under FLSA).
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State courts outside of New York interpreted their class action rules in a
similar fashion.57 In Illinois, an appeals court rejected a representative action
by customers of the local telephone utility, alleging that the company failed
to provide them with printed directories in compliance with the commerce
commission’s rules and that they suffered “millions of hours of time,
inconvenience, and aggravation.”58 The court held that each customer’s claim
was “legally separate and distinct since each subscriber’s claim presents a
different question with respect to the right of recovery and the amount of the
alleged damages.”59 In Kentucky, the state’s highest court likewise dismissed
a representative suit filed on behalf of 199 African-American land purchasers
who each were induced to buy property based on alleged fraudulent
statements by the seller.60 Although the purchasers did not seek damages but
only to rescind the land sales contracts and recover the price paid, the court
nonetheless denied relief.61
Thus, the courts hewed to a 19th century understanding of the
representative suit, despite dramatic changes in the social, economic, and
legal context surrounding them. Two Illinois attorneys, Harry Kalven, Jr. and
Maurice Rosenfield, described these changes in the pages of the University
of Chicago Law Review in 1941. They observed: “Modern society seems
increasingly to expose men to such group injuries for which individually they
are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know
enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive.”62 Examples
included employees who were denied their overtime pay, stockholders who
invested based on misrepresentations, and utility customers who were
overcharged. 63 They lamented that, in the absence of a way to aggregate
individuals claims, “there will at best be a random and fragmentary [law]
enforcement, if there is any at all.”64
57. Joseph J. Jr. Simeone, Class Suits under the Codes, 7 W. RES. L. REV. 5–44, 29 (1955)
(noting that “state courts in construing the [Field] code provision consistently deny the propriety of
the class suit device where one or more seek to represent a group of persons who have separate and
distinct claims, and each one is entitled to distinct relief”).
58. Burke v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 348 Ill. App. 529, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952).
59. Id. at 536-37 ; see also Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662 (1917)
(dismissing representative suit brought by customers against gas company for overcharges); Batman
v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 187 Ky. 659 (1920) (same); Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp.,
151 Ohio St. 417, 423 (1949)(same).
60. Acton v. Johnson, 240 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Ky. 1951)
61. Acton v. Johnson, 240 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Ky. 1951); see also Spear v. H.V. Greene Co., 246
Mass. 259, 270 (1923) (affirming dismissal of class suit by purchasers of stock who alleged the
sales were procured by the seller’s fraud and sought to rescind the sales);
Thomas v. Ky. Tr. & Sec. Co., 156 Ky. 260, 160 S.W. 1037, 1038 (1913) (dismissing representative
suit by borrowers to recovery usurious loan charges from lender).
62. Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941).
63. Id. at 684.
64. Id. at 686.
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ENERATION LATER

American consumerism grew significantly in the decades after World
War II, serving to magnify the number of unredressed group injuries that
Kalven and Rosenfield had described in their 1941 article. In the post-war
period, after the austerity of the Depression and war years, Americans eagerly
purchased new furniture, radios, vacuum cleaners, televisions, refrigerators,
and freezers – often on credit.65 But new products also created opportunities
for new forms of fraud and sharp dealing. Appliance purchasers complained
that fast-talking sellers peddling new household technologies preyed on
unsophisticated buyers, that sellers engaged in bait-and-switch advertising,
that repair shops and detailers performed shoddy work, and that merchants
overpriced their wares and sold defective goods.66
Substantive consumer law grew over the 1950s and 1960s,67 but private
enforcement mechanisms did not in most jurisdictions. More states regulated
retailers who sold goods on credit,68 as well as food and drug makers69 and
chemical manufacturers who sold households goods such as cleaning
products.70 Most states also adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which
included provisions governing the sale of goods and granted courts the power
to refuse enforcement of “unconscionable” contracts. 71 And a handful of
states enacted statutes banning unfair and deceptive trade practices and
allowing aggrieved consumers to bring private lawsuits.72 These new state
laws supplemented existing consumer credit statutes, utility regulations, and
common-law tort and contract rules. The federal government also slowly
began to enact consumer legislation, starting in the late 1950s with rules
requiring uniform price disclosures for new cars.73
Unfortunately for consumers, these rights provided little protection in the
absence of mechanisms for private enforcement. In New York, for example,
65.
66.
67.
68.

FLEMING, supra note 18, at 141–42.
Id. at 159.
See supra note 53 and 55.
Wallace P. Mors, State Regulation of Retail Installment Financing-Progress and Problems
I, 23 J. BUS. U. CHI. 199 (1950).
69. Benjamin F. Stapleton, Administration and Enforcement of State Food and Drug Laws, 10
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 794, 795 (1955).
70. Marian Moser Jones & Isidore Daniel Benrubi, Poison Politics: A Contentious History of
Consumer Protection Against Dangerous Household Chemicals in the United States, 103 AM. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 801, 808 (2013).
71. [insert dates for UCC state adoption] On how the UCC provision led to the reinvigoration
of common law unconscionability, see Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as
the “Law of the Poor”, 102 GEO. L. J. 1383 (2014).
72. On state laws, William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L.
REV. 724, 743–44, 749-750 (1971). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also had the power to
police UDAPs. But the federal law, enacted in 1938, did not provide a private right of action. The
state laws were often modeled on the FTC Act, but many provided a private right of action.
73. Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 72 Stat. 325 (1958).
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the state adopted landmark retail installment sales legislation in 1957, which
mandated that certain disclosures be provided to consumers and also imposed
price caps on finance charges.74 But the law lacked mechanisms for private
enforcement. 75 Any individual claim would yield a small damage award,
meaning that individual consumers would not find it worthwhile to sue.
Noting this defect, one of the law’s key supporters proposed additional
legislation that would offer treble damages, lower barriers to suing in small
claims court, and allow consumer class actions to proceed. None of these
proposals came to fruition, however.76
Some states did relax their rigid approach to consumer class actions in
the 1960s. Both California and Illinois allowed class suits by consumers, in
contrast to states such as New York that continued to follow their line of prior
procedural decisions.77 The seminal case in California was Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co., in which a consumer brought a class suit against a taxicab company
to recover overcharges made in violation of the cab rates set by the local
public utilities commission. 78 Although the state’s class action statute
followed the Field Code model, as in New York, the California Supreme
Court interpreted it quite differently in Daar. The court allowed the class suit
to proceed, noting that no individual victim would likely recover at all if the
class suit were dismissed. “[A]bsent a class suit, recovery by any of the
individual taxicab users is unlikely,” it observed.79 “The complaint alleges
that there is a relatively small loss to each individual class member. In such
a case separate actions would be economically unfeasible.”80 An Illinois trial
court similarly allowed a class action to proceed against Montgomery Ward
by a class of charge account customers who alleged that Ward’s had charged
them for credit life insurance without their permission in violation of the
state’s deceptive trade practices law.81
In contrast, New York remained hostile to consumer class actions. In
1970, the state’s highest court had the opportunity to revisit its class action
jurisprudence in light of recent decisions in other states and the changing
consumer marketplace. The class of consumers in Hall v. Coburn Corp.
alleged that they signed standardized sales contracts to buy carpet on credit
and that the type size used in the contracts was too small, in violation of the
74. FLEMING, supra note 18, at 169.
75. The New York Attorney General (AG) and the state Banking Department both asserted
public enforcement authority under the law. Id. at 170. The AG did not make much use of the law,
instead prioritizing litigation against bait advertising and industry self-regulation. Id.
76. Id. at 169–70.
77. See infra note 78 and 79.
78. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 699 (1967).
79. Id. at 738.
80. Id. at 715.
81. 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 14 (1969) (summarizing the court in Holstein v. Montgomery
Ward & Company, Inc., No. 68CH275 (Ill., Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch. Div., filed Jan. 16, 1968)).
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sale retail installment sales act. The defendant finance company, the Coburn
Corporation, had purchased the credit contracts from the original carpet
sellers. The class sought to recoup the penalty provided by the retail
installment law, which was equal to the credit service charge each purchaser
had paid, or approximately $100 to 200 per class member.82
A number of factors distinguished the Hall case from the pre-World War
II class action claims where state courts had denied relief to the consumers.
Most importantly, in addition to the changed social and economic context,
the attorneys supporting class relief for the Hall consumers represented a
different slice of the legal profession than the New York attorneys who had
attempted to pursue class litigation on behalf of consumers in the 1940s.
Class counsel, Phillip Schrag, worked at the National Office for the Rights
of the Indigent (NORI), the new “poverty-law affiliate” of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, 83 where he headed up their consumer litigation campaign,
bringing test cases to try to shift legal doctrine in favor of consumers. 84
Rather than making money, Schrag aimed to remake the law.85 Others in the
legal profession supported this cause. The New York Attorney General and
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York both joined the Hall case
on the side of the consumers, submitting amicus briefs.86
In advocating for the class to be allowed to proceed, Schrag emphasized
the same concerns that had motivated the California court in Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co. to allow a consumer class. Schrag explained that, in the absence of
class relief, consumers would have no redress. The size of each claim was
tiny and no lawyer would accept an individual case expected to pay out less
than $200.87 The alternative to a class suit was not a multiplicity of suits, but
none at all.
Schrag’s argument did not move New York’s highest court, however.
The court’s reasoning rested on its skepticism of the consumers’ claims as
well as its understanding of the state’s existing class action jurisprudence. In
refusing to allow the suit to proceed as a class action, the court opined that
“[n]o significant public benefit is discernible from the acceptance of these
present class actions.”88 In other words, the court saw little value in enforcing
the type-size rules in the state retail installment sales law. It viewed the
plaintiffs’ statutory claims as a backdoor effort to remedy the real harm that
they suffered: paying too much for credit. The court refused to alter New
York’s longstanding class action rules for a suit about the “technicality” of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

FLEMING, supra note 18, at 205.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 206.
Hall v. Coburn Corp. of Am., 26 N.Y.2d 396,404 (1970)
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type size. 89 As one commentator noted, “New York courts take the
mechanical position that most actions for monetary recoveries turn on facts
peculiar to each individual plaintiff.”90
After Hall, it became apparent that change would not emanate from the
courts. If state consumer law were to be enforced through private litigation,
it would require enabling legislation. Accordingly, various groups urged the
New York State legislature to update the state’s class action law to keep pace
with modern trends. The New York Judicial Conference and, later, the New
York Court of Appeals, both called upon the state to act. Citing the Hall case,
the state court justices noted that there was “urgency for early legislation” to
broaden the scope of the class action, since “the existing restrictions” often
meant “a total lack of remedy, as a practical matter, for wrongs demanding
correction.”91 In 1975, the New York legislature finally passed a new rule
that was modeled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
federal class action law adopted less than a decade prior – in 1966.92
Although this 1975 change brought New York more closely in line with
states like California, it did not overrule all aspects of the Hall decision. The
legislature shared the New York courts’ skepticism about small-dollar
consumer claims. The new law provided that “an action to recover a penalty,
or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be
maintained as a class action,” unless explicitly authorized by statute. 93 In
other words, under the new class action law, the Hall consumer plaintiffs still
could not have aggregated their claims for the statutory damages allowed by
the state’s retail installment sales act. The legislature would allow consumers
to aggregate their claims in state court, so long as those claims arose out of
quantifiable harms. But, unless the legislature made an exception, statutory
penalties for what might be deemed “technical” violations of consumer rights
could only be recovered through individual actions. This incremental change
in class action procedure reflected New York’s general reluctance to abandon
its 19th century procedural rules. When other states modernized their rules to
mimic federal procedures, New York judges and practitioners resisted.94

89. FLEMING, supra note 18, at 206.
90. Richard F. Jr. Dole, Consumer Class Actions under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 80, 104–05 (1969).
91. FLEMING, supra note 18, at 207.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 208.The U.S. Supreme Court later ruled, in 2010, that this limitation does not apply to
state law class suits brought in federal court. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
94. Jack B. Weinstein, CPLR’s Genesis The CPLR at Fifty: Its Past, Present, and Future, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 650 (2013) (noting that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, “the
bar, the judges, and the legislature” rejected attempts to replace New York procedural rules with
Federal Rules). Even today, some New York rules follow the federal model, but New York retains
“a fair number of eccentricities.” Vincent C. Alexander, The CPLR at Fifty: A View from Academia
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STATE CLASS ACTIONS AFTER FRCP

New York’s 1975 change to its class action rule tracked a general trend
in the states to amend their class action statutes to track Rule 23. By the mid1980s, most states had amended their class action statutes. 95 California
retained its older class action rule, but courts interpreted the rule to loosely
follow the FRCP 23 requirements.96 Among the states, only Mississippi and
Virginia never adopted class action procedural rules. 97 These changes
coincided with a rising tide of consumer activism, commonly dubbed the
“third wave” of the consumer movement, which reached its height in the
1970s.
FRCP 23, as amended in 1966, ushered in a revolution in federal class
action practice, but not for consumer cases. 98 Shortly after the Rule 23
amendments went into effect in 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that
small-dollar state law claims still could not proceed in federal court. In
Snyder v. Harris, the Court held that class members could not aggregate their
claims to reach the minimum “amount in controversy” requirement for
diversity actions, which was then $10,000.99 U.S. Senator Joseph Tydings
observed, in advocating for a legislative reversal of the decision, “This ruling
in effect makes the Rule 23 action, the most modern class action procedure
in the United States, unavailable to the defrauded consumer who has a claim
of less than $10,000, even if he can satisfy the necessary diversity of
citizenship requirement for Federal jurisdiction.”100 Tydings’s bill, to reverse
Snyder and allow consumer class actions to proceed in federal court, failed.
Federal class actions did expand, however, because of new federal
consumer legislation encompassing claims for violation of federal securities,
antitrust, and employment discrimination laws. Consumers also brought class
actions under federal consumer protection laws, most notably under the 1968
Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 101 But federal courts looked skeptically at
TILA class actions, just as an earlier generation of state court judges did for
state law claims based on technical errors in contractual fine print. As class
The CPLR at Fifty: Its Past, Present, and Future, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 664, 665
(2013).
95. Robert A. Skirnick & Patricia I. Avery, The State Court Class Action - A Potpourri of
Differences, 20 FORUM 750–772, 759 (1985).
96. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS App. C (California)
(10th ed. 2020).
97. For the timing of state rule adoptions, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1544–51 (2008).
98. Skirnick and Avery, supra note 95 at 750. (noting that developments “have virtually knocked
non-federal question class actions out of the federal arena”)
99. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,
291 (1973) (holding that multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each satisfy the
jurisdictional amount for suits in federal courts).
100. Joseph D. Tydings, Private Bar – Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 483 (1970).
101. Marcus, supra note 1, at 629.
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action historian David Marcus explains, TILA class claims “proliferated” but
trial judges “overwhelmingly refused to certify TILA classes.”102 Prompted
by business concerns over potentially “catastrophic judgments” against
defendants, Congress capped class recoveries under TILA in 1974.103 This
reduced but did not eliminate TILA class suits.104
Although the general trend, post-1966, was of convergence between
federal and state class action procedures, distinctions remained. California,
for example, adopted an unfair and deceptive practices act that included its
own class certification requirements. Unlike FRCP 23 or California’s general
class action statute, the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act did not
require plaintiffs to prove the superiority of the class device or “substantial
benefit to the public” for class certification.105 Likewise, Illinois adopted a
more permissive “superiority” standard for certifying a class under its state
rule.106 West Virginia explicitly rejected the more rigid federal approach to
determining “predominance” for class certification purposes, instead
adopting a balancing test.107 In addition, although all states required notice to
class members, some states granted class counsel greater flexibility in the
method of notice required than was allowed under federal law. 108 Legal
scholar Diego Zambrano has described these distinctions as a “growing
procedural gulf between state and federal courts,” with state courts drifting
in a proplaintiff direction and federal courts leaning prodefendant.109
Conversely, post-1966, consumer litigants have occasionally been better
off in federal court under federal class action standards than in certain state
courts. For example, although New York state law has barred class actions
for the recovery of statutory penalties, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
this prohibition does not apply if plaintiffs proceed in federal court.110 Some
states have also required plaintiffs to affirmatively opt-in to a class, rather
than following the federal practice of binding class members unless they
opted out, which reduces class size and overall recoveries.111

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 629–30.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1429, at 37 (1974).
See e.g., Hickey v. Great Western Mortgage Corp., 158 F.R.D. 603, 607-14 (1994).
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 94, at App. C (California).
Id. at App. C (Illinois).
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 311 (2011) (discussing difference between West
Virginia and federal standards).
108. Skirnick & Avery, supra note 93, at 762–63. For a detailed analysis of state notification
requirements as of 1980, see Zachary A. Smith, Class Action: State Notification Requirements after
Eisen, 8 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1–20 (1980).
109. Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
2101, 2164 (2019). See also Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 411, 432–434 (2018) (tracking state court rulings on the “commonality” requirement
after Wal-Mart v. Dukes).
110. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 401-402 (2010).
111. SKIRNICK & AVERY, supra note 93, at 764–65.
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Up until 1985, many state courts proved a more limited forum for
consumers than federal courts in one further respect: their ability to
adjudicate “multistate” class actions, meaning actions involving plaintiffs
who resided in multiple states.112 New York, for example, elected to employ
an opt-in procedure for non-resident class members, to address concerns that
exercising jurisdiction over such plaintiffs might otherwise be
unconstitutional. 113 New Jersey and Pennsylvania similarly refused to
exercise jurisdiction over non-resident class members.114 Meanwhile, Kansas
allowed multistate actions, setting a precedent later followed by Illinois.115
Wisconsin, likewise, permitted a multistate class to proceed with adequate
notice and representation.116
The U.S. Supreme Court removed any doubt about state court
jurisdiction over multistate class suits in 1985. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, the Court held that class members need not have “minimum contacts”
with a state in order for a state court decision to bind them.117 Rather, in suits
seeking predominantly money damages, due process merely required that
class members receive adequate representation and notice of the suit, and
have the right to opt-out. If state courts could limit the class to those subject
to the forum state’s law or resolve choice of law questions for non-resident
plaintiffs, the way was clear for them to adjudicate suits involving a
nationwide class. The number of multistate class actions rose accordingly.118
Consumer class actions, including those involving non-resident
plaintiffs, thus remained the domain of state courts until 2005, when
Congress adopted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). CAFA expanded
the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction to allow federal judges to hear most
class actions where the class comprised at least 100 members, at least one
plaintiff was a citizen of a state different from any defendant, and total class
damages exceeded $5 million.119 Even if the class did not file in federal court,
112. Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification Notes, 92 HARV. L. REV.
718, 719 (1978).
113. SKIRNICK & AVERY, supra note 93, at 758.
114. Klemow v. Time Inc., 352 A.2d 12, 16 (Pa. 1976); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 362 A.2d
1177, 1182 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
115. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 567 P.2d 1292, 1308 (Kan. 1977); Miner v. Gillette Co.,
87 Ill.2d 7 (1981).
116. Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 271 N.W.2d 879, 886 (Wis. 1978).
117. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
118. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 94, at App. C. (observing that after Shutts,
the “succeeding decade witnessed a significant increase in the number of multi-state class actions
being adjudicated in the state courts.”); Jesse T. Smallwood, Nationwide, State Law Class Actions
and the Beauty of Federalism Note, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1137–38 (2003). The Court’s recent
decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), concerned personal
jurisdiction in a mass-tort case. Courts so far have not applied its reasoning to curtail jurisdiction in
class actions. Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Did Bristol-Myers Squibb Kill the Nationwide Class Action?,
129 YALE L.J. 205, 226 (2019).
119. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 4(a)(2)(A), 4(a)(5)(B), 119 Stat.
4, 9-10 (Feb. 18, 2005).
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CAFA granted defendants the right to remove the case to federal court if it
met the criteria for original CAFA jurisdiction. Despite the absence of
empirical evidence of pro-class bias in state court, 120 CAFA’s drafters
assumed that federal courts would be more dispassionate than state courts in
their review of class action cases and lamented state court “bias against outof-State defendants.”121 Opinion among litigators and court watchers tracked
the views of the CAFA drafters, that state and federal judges were differently
disposed towards class actions.122
CAFA also reflected more general congressional distrust of the lawyers
that brought class suits. 123 Several members of Congress disparaged
plaintiffs’ lawyers in their remarks in support of the bill.124 Senator Chuck
Grassley opined that “class action lawsuits are more likely to enrich the
lawyers filing them than compensate the consumers who’ve been harmed.”125
These concerns persisted despite, or perhaps because of, the increasing size
and sophistication of the plaintiffs’ bar relative to its modest beginnings in
the 1930s and 40s. A more sophisticated and substantial plaintiffs’ bar
emerged in the 1980s.126 By the early 2000s, the leading plaintiffs’ firms were
not solo practitioners, but rather large firms staffed by attorneys experienced

120. See, e.g., Willy E. Rice, Allegedly Biased, Intimidating, and Incompetent State Court Judges
and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly Impartial and Competent
Federal Courts - A Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class Action Disposition
in Federal and State Courts, 1925-2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419–574 (2012). See also
THOMAS E. WILLIGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 54 (2005)
(“State forums were not typically more favorable for plaintiffs, and federal forums were not
typically more favorable for defendants. … Attorney choice of forum may have been influenced by
routine acceptance of a general set of preconceptions about the differences between state and federal
courts.”).
121. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(B), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (Feb. 18,
2005).
122. William R. Shafton, California’s Uncommon Common Law Class Action Litigation
Developments in the Law: Complex Litigation in California and Beyond, 41 LOY. L. A. L. REV.
783, 832 (2008); THOMAS E. WILLIGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2930 (2005).
123. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1593,
1596 (2008) (“Taken together, the overall message of recent developments seems to be, ‘in
theory, class actions are fine, but in practice, don’t trust the class action lawyers.’”).
124. Id. at 1599-1601 (collecting legislators’ statements expressing).
125. Id. at 1600 (quoting Grassley).
126. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2006).
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in complex litigation.127 These attorneys were also better resourced than their
predecessors and thus able to finance larger suits.128
For the first time, CAFA opened the federal courts to nearly every type
of small-dollar consumer claim that class counsel might bring. Indeed,
plaintiffs could be forced to litigate in federal court, even if they would prefer
a state forum, unless one of the handful of CAFA removal exceptions
applied. 129 Congress tailored these exceptions to allow truly intrastate
disputes to remain in state courts. Under CAFA, plaintiffs had a limited menu
of options for thwarting removal by defendants, such as limiting the
aggregate class demand for damages to less than five million dollars.130 A
2008 study by the Federal Judicial Center found that CAFA worked as
intended. It observed a “dramatic increase” in the number of diversity class
actions filed in federal court from an average of 11.9 per month to 34.5 per
month.131 At least one state, Illinois, may have bolstered this trend towards
federal filings by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over multistate class
actions unless they arose of out events with a “substantial nexus” to the
state.132
Moreover, even for the small number of consumer class actions that
could remain in state court under CAFA, other federal legal developments
increasingly prevented state courts from adjudicating these claims. States
could control their own substantive and procedural rules but could not opt
out of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Enacted in the 1920s to combat
judicial hostility towards enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements,
the FAA provided that a contract provision requiring settlement of disputes
by arbitration would be fully enforceable, “[on] such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”133 The FAA took on new
significance at the close of the 20th century, when businesses discovered that
127. Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757, 776
(2012) (“[T]he information that is available suggests that the leading plaintiffs’ class action firms
are large.”).
128. Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary
Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219,
232 (2001).
129. Exceptions include for class actions where more than two-thirds of the class members are
citizens of the state in which the case was originally filed, at least one defendant is a citizen of that
state, and the “principal injuries” occurred in that state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
130. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 94, at 2.6 (“How to Keep a Class Action
in State Court”).
131 Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2008), at 1-2, https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/2012/CAFA0408.pdf.
132. Justin Lee Heather, A Higher Bar for Class Action Litigation in Illinois Civil Practice, 95
ILL. B.J. 356 (2007). Such class actions might also be removable under CAFA, even if Illinois would
entertain the case. Id. at 357.
133. Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 371, 397 (2016).
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boilerplate arbitration clauses in consumer contracts could prevent class-wide
adjudication. As legal scholar Myriam Gilles described, “by far the most
effective strategy implemented by class action opponents was drafting
standard form consumer contracts to include arbitration provisions expressly
waiving the right to any collective adjudication of claims.”134
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the FAA
that squelched state efforts to push back against boilerplate arbitration clauses
and preserve state jurisdiction over class actions. In a victory for plaintiffs,
California state courts deemed arbitration clauses that included a class action
waiver to be per se unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.135 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, invalidated this line of decisions, ruling that a state
could not deem an entire class of arbitration clauses to be unenforceable. The
California approach ran afoul of the FAA.136 A few years later, the Court
doubled down on its broad interpretation of the FAA, holding that a court
could not invalidate an arbitration agreement on the grounds that it would be
cost-prohibitive for plaintiffs to proceed through individual cases.137
As a result of these federal developments, consumer class actions have
become increasingly difficult to maintain in state courts. Defendants have the
right to remove most class actions to federal court under CAFA, which also
encourages class plaintiffs to file in federal court at the outset to avoid the
cost and delay of removal. Moreover, even if CAFA does not apply, under
federal arbitration law as interpreted by the Supreme Court, a class of
consumers may be left with no judicial forum – state or federal – if they
signed boilerplate arbitration agreements.
CONCLUSION
Looking back in time to the 1930s and 1940s, the present landscape of
consumer class action litigation appears both radically different and strangely
familiar. The differences are striking: now, consumers can pursue class
claims, arising under both state and federal substantive law, in federal court.
Then, they could not – and would not acquire this right for some time. Now,
the consumer class action is a controversial but established form of litigation,
supported by a vigilant, experienced and sophisticated plaintiffs’ bar. Then,
no one specialized in class representation; indeed, would-be class counsel
struggled to convince courts that aggregation of claims did not violate
attorney ethics rules.

134. Id.
135. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 79, 85, 88 (2005) New Jersey
aligned with California, but other states upheld these waivers. Neal H. Klausner, Are Consumer
Class Action Waiver Provisions Enforceable, 124 BANKING L.J. 113, 114-15 (2007).
136 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
137. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2013).
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But these stark differences can also obscure the similarities between the
present and the earliest days of consumer class litigation. First, today, as in
the past, the strength of consumer rights cannot be measured without taking
account of the procedural mechanisms for enforcing those rights through
private lawsuits, which includes rules governing the class action device.
Meaningful enforcement of substantive consumer law depends on the
existence of procedural rules that allow the aggregation of small-dollar
claims. In the absence of class actions, consumers must rely on public
enforcement, free legal aid, or the goodwill of businesses to receive redress
for small injuries.
Second, today, as in the past, consumer class actions provoke heightened
scrutiny from judges and legislators. For much of the 20th century, such suits
arose out of state substantive law and were pursued in state courts, but the
underlying anxieties do not differ much in the present. Earlier generations of
judges fretted that class counsel drummed up disputes in order to generate
fees and that allowing them to aggregate consumers’ claims would threaten
businesses with potentially ruinous liability for technical legal violations.
Relatedly, some judges also worried that procedural aggregation thwarted the
intention of the legislature in creating the underlying substantive consumer
rights, turning minor penalties into major sanctions against defendants. These
apprehensions persist today among legislators and political pundits, while
they more commonly remain under the surface of judicial reasoning.
In sum, the current moment – of heightened hostility to consumer class
actions and concern among advocates that consumer rights lack meaningful
remedies – shares much in common with the earliest days of class action
practice in state courts. For proponents of consumer class litigation, this
decline is dispiriting. But understanding the deeper and richer history of
consumer class actions, which dates back before 1966, may offer some
reason to be hopeful.
The longer arc of this history is not one of mere decline, but in fact
resembles a pendulum swinging back and forth – of rising and falling support
for class actions since the 1930s. In the 1930s and 1940s, consumer rights
were still in their infancy and judges perceived enterprising lawyers’ attempts
to aggregate these claims as a danger to the reputation of the legal profession
and finances of the business community, rather than as a boon to aggrieved
consumers. By the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the volume of consumer
legislation had grown alongside evidence of real consumer injuries caused by
business practices, and the consumer movement was once more ascendant.
Moreover, consumer advocates, judges, and legislators had become better
attuned to the need for procedural mechanisms for private vindication of
small-dollar consumer harms. When political and judicial hostility to class
actions climbed in the more business-friendly climate of the 1990s and early
2000s, it was partially in response to the very success of plaintiffs’ lawyers
in deploying the procedural tools they had gained in the 1960s and 1970s.
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Whether the fortunes of the consumer class action will reverse course once
more will depend on public perception of the plaintiffs’ bar, as well as the
perceived importance of protecting consumer rights and ensuring their
enforcement against the business community through private litigation.

